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IS A WEBSITE SUBJECT TO TITLE III OF THE ADA:
WHY THE TEXT APPLIES TO ONLY WEBSITES
“OF” A PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
Trevor Paul†
Abstract
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits
discrimination involving the “goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” The ADA lists examples that qualify as “public accommodations,” but it does not define the word “place.” As a result, the circuit
courts since 1995 have been split over whether a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a physical place. Courts have recently addressed whether websites are subject to Title III and have relied primarily on precedent on the interpretation of a “place of public
accommodation.” District courts within the Minority Approach have
consistently held that a website is a “place of public accommodation.”
In contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a website
is not a “place of public accommodation” and thus, not subject to Title
III. Oddly enough, no court has held that a website is a “service,”
“privilege,” or “advantage” of a “place of public accommodation.”
This Comment urges courts to subject Title III to only websites “of” a
“place of public accommodation.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
While people increasingly rely on the internet, social media,
online shopping, and web-based services, millions of disabled Americans continue to struggle with accessing these services.1 As a result,
website accessibility lawsuits filed in federal courts have steadily
1. Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, Disabled Americans are Less Likely to
Use Technology, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact
-tank/2017/04/07/disabled-americans-are-less-likely-to-use-technology/
[https:/
/perma.cc/X5QA-MU5Q].
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increased from 814 in 2017 to more than 2,523 in 2020.2 These lawsuits involve Title III of the ADA,3 which was enacted just one year
before websites went public,4 and thus does not address whether websites or web-based services are subject to Title III.
Title III prohibits discrimination involving the “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation.”5 Title III provides twelve categories
of private entities that qualify as “public accommodations,” such as
hotels, restaurants, grocery stores, and many others, but it does not
define the word “place.”6 Thus, Title III leaves the first two words of
a “place of public accommodation” open to interpretation by the
courts. As a result, the circuit courts are split on whether a “place of
public accommodation” is limited to a physical place.7
The Majority Approach adopted by the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits interprets “places of public accommodation” to apply only to physical locations and require a sufficient nexus
between the goods or services complained of and an actual physical
place.8 In contrast, the Minority Approach, adopted by First and Seventh Circuits, holds that a “place of public accommodation” is not limited to a physical place.9 This circuit split over the physical nature of
a “place of public accommodation” has historically had little practical
2. Kristina M. Launey & Minh N. Vu, Federal Website Accessibility Lawsuits
Increased in 2020 Despite Mid-Year Pandemic Lull, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP: ADA
TITLE III NEWS & INSIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2021/04
/federal-website-accessibility-lawsuits-increased-in-2020-despite-mid-year-pandemic-lull/ [https://perma.cc/VV9U-L54K].
3. Id.
4. Major Dan, February 26, 1991: When Did the Internet Go Public? (First
Web Browser), HIST. & HEADLINES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.historyandheadlines.com/february-26-1991-internet-go-public-first-web-browser/
[https:/
/perma.cc/A6QJ-WQHE].
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
7. Compare Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New
Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1994) and Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268
F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001), with Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,
612–14 (3d Cir. 1998), Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530,
531–36 (5th Cir. 2016), Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–15 (6th
Cir. 1997), Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–14
(9th Cir. 2000), and Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1280–81
(11th Cir. 2002).
8. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Magee, 833 F.3d at 532–36; Parker, 121 F.3d at
1010–14; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1113–15; Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284–85 n. 8.
9. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
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effect on the outcome of Title III lawsuits. But recently, courts considering websites, mobile applications, and web-based services (hereinafter “websites”) under Title III have treated this circuit split over a
“place of public accommodation” as determinative of whether websites are subject to Title III liability.10
While the larger issue is how websites comply with Title III,
this Comment seeks only to analyze if Title III applies to a website.
This Comment endorses the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation that a website itself is not a “place of public accommodation” but
advocates that courts should not limit their analysis to only that portion
of the text.11 Rather, courts should also consider whether a website is
a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” of a “place of public accommodation.”12 To reach this conclusion, Part II will provide background
of Title III, including an overview of the ADA and the scope of Title
III.13 Part III will then provide a textual breakdown of the caselaw
based on the four parts of Title III,14 and Part IV will explain how
courts have failed to understand these parts.15 Part V provides an overview of how courts have applied Title III to websites.16 Finally, Part
VI will explain why only websites “of” a “place of public accommodation” should be subject to Title III.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enacting the ADA
While the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s made significant progress toward protecting the rights of minorities and women,
the rights of individuals with disabilities were not protected until much
later.18 Discrimination against individuals with disabilities was not addressed until 1973 when Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act
was enacted, which banned federal funding recipients from
10. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459; §
12182(a).
11. See infra Part V–VI.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. History of the ADA, MID-ATL. ADA CTR., http://www.adainfo.org/content
/history-ada [https://perma.cc/H8DL-B64B].
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discriminating on the basis of disability.19 Although the Rehabilitation
Act was a step toward equal rights for disabled Americans, the Act did
not protect individuals with disabilities in areas such as employment,
public accommodation, and transportation.20
Yet in 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into
law and established “the world’s first comprehensive declaration of
equality for people with disabilities.”21 Modeled after the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which made discrimination based on race, religion, sex,
and national origin illegal,22 the ADA afforded similar protections for
those with disabilities.23 In particular, the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in important areas of life, such
as: employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and places of public
accommodation (Title III).24
B. Title III of the ADA
Title III of the ADA states that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”25 The ADA does not define the word “place,” but it does
list twelve categories of private entities that qualify as “public accommodations.”26 These twelve categories are found in Section 12181(7)
and are as follows:
a) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging;
b) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or
drink;
c) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or
other place of exhibition or entertainment;
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Laura Wolk, Note, Equal Access in Cyberspace: On Bridging the Digital
Divide in Public Accommodations Coverage Through Amendment to the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1068 (July 26, 1990)).
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, S.J. Res. 102d Cong. § 3 (1991); 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 2000(e).
23. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
24. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
26. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a).
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d) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering;
e) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store,
shopping center, or other sales or retail establishment;
f) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop,
travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station,
office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment;
g) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
h) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
i) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
j) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
k) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter,
food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
l) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
other place of exercise or recreation.27
Notably, Section 12181(7) does not mention websites, but it does include broad catch-all language in each category.28 In addition, these
twelve categories pertain only to “public accommodations.” Thus,
even if an entity’s operations fall within one of the twelve categories
above, Title III only applies to “places of” those operations.29 Title III
provides additional specific requirements, but this Comment focuses
on whether a website is subject to Title III liability.
C. Department of Justice
The ADA authorizes the Attorney General to issue implementing regulations and guidelines to aid in the interpretation and enforcement of Title III.30 Under this authority, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), via the Attorney General, defined a “place of public accommodation” to include any “facility operated by a private entity whose
operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of” the twelve
categories provided in the regulations.31 Although the twelve categories provided by the regulations are virtually identical to those offered
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

§ 12181(7).
Id.
§ 12182(a).
§ 12186(b).
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2020).
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in Section 12181(7), the regulations define a “place” as a “facility,”
which in turn is defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures,
sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances,
roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.”32
In 1996, the DOJ released its position on the applicability of
the ADA to websites, stating that “places of public accommodation”
with websites must ensure that their websites are accessible.33 But it
was not until 2010 that the DOJ proposed a rule to apply Title III of
the ADA to websites regardless of their connection to a “place of public accommodation.”34 In 2017, the Trump Administration, however,
added the proposed rule to a list of “inactive” regulatory actions,35 and
the DOJ later withdrew the proposal.36
Shortly after the DOJ withdrew the proposed rule, the DOJ
filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court supporting the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc. that
Coca-Cola’s vending machines were not “places of public accommodation.”37 In its amicus brief, the DOJ stated that vending machines
are not “places of public accommodation,” but that “questions concerning Title III’s application to non-physical establishments—including websites or digital services—may someday warrant this
Court’s attention.”38 Despite the DOJ’s refusal to take a position in its
32. Id.
33. See Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Dep’t of
Just., C.R. Div., to Tom Harkin, U.S. Sen., (Sept. 9, 1996), https://www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/tal712.txt [https://perma.cc/B8B8-9TN8].
34. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35–36).
35. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2017 Inactive Actions, REGINFO
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/InactiveRINs_2017_Agenda_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DGS-X3DN].
36. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Notice of Withdrawal of Four
Previously Announced Rulemaking Actions, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (Dec. 26, 2017)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35–36); Kristina M. Launey & Minh N. Vu, Federal
Website Accessibility Lawsuits Increased in 2020 Despite Mid-Year Pandemic Lull,
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP: ADA TITLE III NEWS & INSIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2021), https:/
/www.adatitleiii.com/2021/04/federal-website-accessibility-lawsuits-increased-in2020-despite-mid-year-pandemic-lull/ [https://perma.cc/VV9U-L54K].
37. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 5, Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments
USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16-668).
38. Id. at 22.
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amicus brief on Title III’s application to websites, the DOJ appeared
to change its tune the next year when members of Congress requested
clarity on “unresolved questions about the applicability of the ADA to
websites,” which have “created a liability hazard that directly affects
businesses in our states . . . .”39 The DOJ responded that if a “place of
public accommodation” has a website, then the website is subject to
liability under Title III.40

III. A TEXTUAL BREAKDOWN OF TITLE III
As depicted above, the text of Title III can be broken into four
portions: (1) “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations”; (2) “of any”; (3) “place of”; and (4) “public accommodation.” A review of Title III caselaw reveals that courts do not
understand these four distinct portions.41 For that reason, the basis of
39. Letter from Members of Cong. to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Dep’t
of Just. (June 20, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/121
/2018/06/ADA-Final-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ER3-WXML].
40. Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to Ted Budd, U.S. H.R. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/121/2018/10/DOJ-letter-to-congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8KAKNJM].
41. See infra Part IV.
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Title III caselaw is not different interpretations of the same words but
rather on the selection or conflation of these four portions.42
The first example of this involves the circuit split on a “place
of public accommodation,” which has two parts: (1) the word “place”
and (2) the twelve “public accommodation” categories.43 The Minority Approach, adopted by the First and Seventh Circuits, holds that a
“place of public accommodation” is not limited to a physical place
based on the twelve “public accommodation” categories, the services
of an entity, and the ADA’s purpose.44 In contrast, the Majority Approach, adopted by the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, interprets “places of public accommodation” to apply only to
physical locations based on the twelve “public accommodation” categories and the word “place.”45 In sum, the Minority Approach ignores
the first portion of a “place of public accommodation”—“place of”—
while the Majority Approach does not.
The second example concerns whether the goods or services
are “of” a place of public accommodation.46 The Majority Approach
and the Second Circuit apply the Nexus Test, which essentially interprets “of” to mean a connection. In effect, the Nexus Test requires a
sufficient nexus or connection between the goods or services complained of and a “place of public accommodation.”47 Courts have not
articulated precisely what that connection is. But, in terms of websites,
courts have found a sufficient connection between a website and a
“place of public accommodation” if a website includes things such as
a store locator or the option to purchase gift cards.48
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2021); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v.
Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 1994);
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001); Ford v. ScheringPlough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–13 (3d Cir. 1998); Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 532–35 (5th Cir. 2016); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–14 (6th Cir. 1997); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–15 (9th Cir. 2000); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd.,
294 F.3d 1279, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2002).
44. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
45. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Magee, 833 F.3d at 532–36; Parker, 121 F.3d at
1010–15; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1113–15; Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1281.
46. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co, 198 F.3d 28, 31–33 (2nd Cir. 1999); Ford,
145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1113–15; Rendon,
294 F.3d at 1284.
47. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
48. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2019);
Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts, LLC, 741 F. App’x 752, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2018).
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A. Place of Public Accommodation
1. The Minority Approach
The First and Seventh Circuits have interpreted a “place of
public accommodation” to extend beyond physical places based on the
twelve “public accommodation” categories, the services of an entity,
and the ADA’s purpose.49 The First Circuit in Carparts was the first
to hold that a “place of public accommodation” is not limited to a
physical place.50 In support, the court first pointed to the inclusion of
the words “travel service” and “service establishment” in the list of
“public accommodations.”51 According to the First Circuit, a “travel
service” is not a physical place because “[m]any travel services conduct business by telephone or correspondence without requiring their
customers to enter an office in order to obtain their services.”52 The
court also noted that a “service establishment” includes providers of
services that do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure.53 Put differently, the court reasoned that a “place of public accommodation” is not limited to a physical place because the services of many entities, whose operations fall within one of the twelve
“public accommodation” categories, are not limited to a physical
place. The court found that to conclude otherwise “would severely
frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy
the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.”54
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Joint Administration Board held that a “place of public accommodation” is not limited
to a physical place for similar reasons.55 But unlike the First Circuit in
Carparts, the court did not specifically reference any examples in the
twelve “public accommodation” categories.56 The court instead relied
on the other two reasons mentioned in Carparts—the services of an
entity and the ADA’s purpose—in stating that “the site of the sale is
irrelevant to Congress’s goal of granting the disabled equal access to
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id.
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sellers of goods and services. What matters is that the good or service
be offered to the public.”57 The First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
did not reference or attempt to interpret the word “place” and only
looked at the twelve “public accommodation” categories when interpreting a “place of public accommodation.”58
2. The Majority Approach
While the Minority Approach looks only at the twelve “public
accommodation” categories, the Majority Approach, adopted by the
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, interprets “places of
public accommodation” to apply only to physical locations based on
the twelve “public accommodation” categories and the word
“place.”59 In other words, the Majority Approach breaks a “place of
public accommodation” into two parts: (1) a place and (2) public accommodation. The Sixth Circuit in Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc. was the first circuit court to hold that a “place of
public accommodation” is limited to the word “place.”60 The court did
not specifically state that a “place of public accommodation” is limited
to a physical place, but, unlike the First Circuit, it highlighted the word
“place.”61 The court reasoned that even if an entity’s operations fell
within one of the twelve “public accommodation” categories, the prohibitions are restricted to “places” of “public accommodation.”62 The
court interpreted a “place” based on the DOJ’s regulations that define
a “place” as a “facility.”63
Shortly after Stouenborough, the Sixth Circuit in Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. addressed the same issue but differed
with the First Circuit’s holding in Carparts based on the twelve “public accommodation” categories rather than the word “place.”64 In
57. Id.
58. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
59. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–13 (3d Cir. 1998); Magee
v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 532–35 (5th Cir. 2016); Parker
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–14 (6th Cir. 1997); Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–15 (9th Cir. 2000); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
60. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 582–83 (6th Cir.
1995).
61. Id. at 583.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
64. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
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Parker, the court reasoned that the First Circuit ignored the text of the
statute and the principle of noscitur a sociis,65 which instructs that
“a . . . term is interpreted within the context of the accompanying
words ‘to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’”66 The court reasoned that an “[o]ffice of an accountant or lawyer, insurance office, and professional office of a healthcare provider,
in the context of the other terms listed, suggest a physical place where
services may be obtained and nothing more.”67 The court added that
“[t]o interpret these terms as permitting a place of accommodation to
constitute something other than a physical place is to ignore the text
of the statute and the principle of noscitur a sociis.”68 For those reasons and because the twelve “public accommodation” categories are
limited to physical places, the court held that a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a physical place.69
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Parker differs from the court’s
prior holding in Stoutenborough for two notable reasons. First, the
court in Parker explicitly held that a “place of public accommodation”
is limited to a physical place.70 The court in Stoutenborough may have
implied that a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a physical place by referencing the DOJ’s regulations defining a “place.”71
But the court did not expressly state this position. Second, the court in
Parker based its reasoning on the twelve “public accommodation” categories, while the court in Stoutenborough based its reasoning on the
word “place.”72 Later, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
followed the Sixth Circuit, holding that a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a physical place but did so based on the word
“place” rather than the “public accommodation” categories.73

65. Id. at 1014.
66. Id. (quoting Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1994)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1010.
70. Id.
71. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1995).
72. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
73. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998); Magee
v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 532–36 (5th Cir. 2016); Weyer
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–15 (9th Cir. 2000); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002).
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B. Goods or Services “of” a Place of Public Accommodation
1. The Majority Approach
After determining whether there is a “place of public accommodation,” the second step of the Majority Approach is to determine
whether the goods or services are “of” a “place of public accommodation.”74 To do so, the Majority Approach applies the Nexus Test,
which requires a sufficient nexus between the goods or services complained of and a “place of public accommodation.”75 While courts
have not explicitly stated that the word “of” is the statutory basis for
the Nexus Test, it is fairly evident because the word “of” is between
what is being complained of and a “place of public accommodation.”76
The Nexus Test first emerged in Stoutenborough, where the
Sixth Circuit considered whether a television broadcast of a professional football game was a service of a “place of public accommodation.”77 Although the football stadiums were indeed a “place of public
accommodation,” the court reasoned that: (1) the broadcasts were not
services or goods of the football stadiums;78 (2) that the plain meaning
of Title III is that a “place of public accommodation” is a place; (3)
and that “all of the services which the public accommodation offers,
not all services which the lessor of the public accommodation offers,
fall within the scope of Title III.”79 In other words, the text regulates
the goods and services of “places of public accommodation,” not the
goods and services of the entity. While the Sixth Circuit in Stoutenborough did not explicitly mention the term “nexus,” the court made
clear that there must be a connection between the service offered and
the “place of public accommodation” for Title III to apply.80

74. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at
1113–15; Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284.
75. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at
1113–15; Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284.
76. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31–33 (2nd Cir. 1999); Ford,
145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1113–15; Rendon,
294 F.3d at 1284.
77. See Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir.
1995).
78. Id. at 583.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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Two years after Stoutenborough, the term “nexus” emerged in
the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Parker.81 The court in Parker held that
while the insurance office was a “place of public accommodation,” the
services that the plaintiff sought had “no nexus” to the insurance office
because the plaintiff “did not access her policy from [an] insurance
office” and instead “obtained her benefits through her employer.”82
Later, the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits followed and
adopted the Nexus Test in determining whether a good or service is
“of” a “place of public accommodation.”83
2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit in Pallozzi also adopted the Nexus Test.
But, unlike the Majority Approach, the court did not take an affirmative position on whether a “place of public accommodation” is limited
to a physical place.84 The court relied on the First Circuit’s holding in
Carparts that limiting “Title III to physical structures . . . would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities
fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available
indiscriminately to other members of the general public.”85 According
to the Second Circuit, however, the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Parker
and the Third Circuit’s holding in Ford were not to the contrary.86 The
court reasoned that while Parker and Ford held that a “place of public
accommodation” is limited to a physical place, these cases did not hold
that “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any
place of public accommodation” is limited to only physical access to
a “place of public accommodation.”87
Although the Second Circuit took no position on the circuit
split, the court did articulate that services with a nexus to a “place of
public accommodation” are not limited to physical access.88 The
81. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
82. Id.
83. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31–33 (2nd Cir. 1999); Ford
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998); Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–15 (9th Cir. 2000); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002).
84. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31–33.
85. Id. at 32–33.
86. Id. at 32 n.3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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court’s holding helped clarify that the Nexus Test involves the word
“of” and that services “of” a “place of public accommodation” are not
limited to physical access, even if a “place of public accommodation”
is limited to a physical place.89
IV. CIRCUIT COURTS FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE FOUR DISTINCT
PORTIONS OF THE TEXT
A. Public Accommodation vs. Place of Public Accommodation
The most common mistake made by courts on both sides of the
circuit split is their failure to recognize that a “place of public accommodation” must be a “place.”90 As mentioned above, Title III provides
twelve categories that constitute a “public accommodation,” not
twelve categories that constitute a “place of public accommodation.”91
Still, courts on both sides of the circuit split have glossed over the
word “place” when interpreting a “place of public accommodation.”92
One example is the Sixth Circuit’s incorrect holding in Parker only
two years after the court’s correct holding in Stoutenborough. In Parker, the Sixth Circuit, referring to Stoutenborough, stated: “As is evident by § 12187(7), a public accommodation is a physical place and
this Court has previously so held.”93 But the court in Stoutenborough
stated that “[f]irst, none of the defendants falls within any of the twelve
‘public accommodation’ categories identified in the statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7). Also, the prohibitions of Title III are restricted to ‘places’
of public accommodation.”94 In other words, the court in Stoutenborough did not hold that a public accommodation is a limited place; the
court held that Title III is “also . . . restricted to ‘places’ of public accommodation.”95 In fact, the court did not even hold that a “place of
public accommodation” is limited to a physical place. While the Sixth
Circuit’s error in Parker has little practical relevance if a “public accommodation” is limited to a physical place, the Sixth Circuit’s error
highlights that even courts applying the Majority Approach fail to
89. Id. at 33.
90. See Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th
Cir. 1995).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
92. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 1010–11.
94. Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
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understand their own precedent and the differences between the “public accommodation” categories and a “place of public accommodation.”
Unlike courts within the Majority Approach that disregard the
word “place,” the Minority Approach’s disregard of the word “place”
is practically relevant because these courts hold that a “place of public
accommodation” is not limited to a physical place.96 The First and
Seventh Circuits hold that a “place of public accommodation” is not
limited to a physical place based solely on the twelve “public accommodation” categories.97 As a result, any entity with operations that fall
within one of the twelve “public accommodation” categories is subject
to Title III liability.98 This mistake is fatal for businesses with websites. Now, district courts applying the Minority Approach have subjected websites to Title III only because the website falls within one
of the twelve “public accommodation” categories.99
B. Place of Public Accommodation vs. Service of a Place of Public
Accommodation
The Minority Approach not only sidesteps the word “place”
when interpreting “place of public accommodation,” but it also mistakenly fails to distinguish “places of public accommodation” from the
“services” of a “place of public accommodation.”100 In essence, the
Minority Approach interprets a “place of public accommodation” to
mean a “service of public accommodation.”
For example, the First Circuit in Carparts held that a “place of
public accommodation” is not limited to a physical place because
places of public accommodation “conduct business by telephone or
correspondence without requiring their customers to enter an office in
order to obtain their services.”101 Conducting business by telephone or
by other means, however, constitutes “services of” a “place of public
96. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., Inc.,
37 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 1994); Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459
(7th Cir. 2001).
97. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
98. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass.
2012).
99. See id. at 201–02.
100. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; see also Morgan v. Joint
Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001).
101. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
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accommodation,” not “places of public accommodation.”102 Thus,
while the court’s holding is that a “place of public accommodation” is
not limited to a physical place, the court’s reasoning stems from the
services of a “place of public accommodation.”103 The Seventh Circuit
in Morgan committed a similar mistake:
The defendant asks us to interpret “public accommodation”
literally, as denoting a physical site, such as a store or a hotel,
but we have already rejected that interpretation . . . The site
of the sale is irrelevant to Congress’s goal of granting the
disabled equal access to sellers of goods and services. What
matters is that the good or service be offered to the public.104
The goods or services of an entity should have no bearing on
whether a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a physical
place. The only bearing the goods and services of an entity should have
is when determining whether an entity’s operations fall within one of
the twelve “public accommodation” categories. The text regulates the
goods and services “of any place of public accommodation,” not the
goods or services of any business.105 The Majority Approach is not
that services of a “place of public accommodation” are limited to a
physical place, only that a “place of public accommodation” is limited
to a physical place.106 Suppose the alleged discrimination turns on services of a “place of public accommodation.” In that case, the Majority
Approach will apply the Nexus Test, which is not limited to discrimination based on the physical nature of goods and services of the “place
of public accommodation.”107
But even courts that follow the Majority Approach fail to understand the difference between a place of public accommodation and
services of a “place of public accommodation.”108 For example, the
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
103. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 20; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
104. Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
105. § 12182(a).
106. See generally Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir.
1998); Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 533–35 (5th
Cir. 2016); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–14 (6th Cir. 1997);
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113–15 (9th Cir.
1999); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).
107. See generally Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins., Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31–33 (2d Cir.
1999); Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at
1115; Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284.
108. Magee, 833 F.3d at 532–36; Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 695 (9th
Cir. 2015).
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Fifth Circuit in Magee reasoned that the Second Circuit in Pallozzi
interpreted a “place of public accommodation” to extend beyond a
physical place.109 Yet the Second Circuit did not take an affirmative
position on whether a “place of public accommodation” is limited to a
physical place.110 The Second Circuit merely held that services of a
“place of public accommodation” are not limited to physical access of
the “place of public accommodation.”111 In fact, the Second Circuit
explained that its holding was not contrary to the Majority Approach:
“[N]either Parker nor Ford held that Title III ensures only physical
access to places of public accommodation. Their reasoning was that
plaintiffs must have a nexus to a place of public accommodation in
order to claim the protections of Title III.”112
The Ninth Circuit in Earll and Weyer committed the same mistake by “interpret[ing] the term ‘place of public accommodation’ to
require ‘some connection between the good or service complained of
and an actual physical place.’”113 In Weyer, the court cited the Third
and Sixth Circuits’ holdings in Ford and Parker in support,114 but
these cases clarify that the connection to the good or service is irrelevant to determine whether there is a “place of public accommodation.”115 In Ford and Parker, the courts concluded that an insurance
office was a “place of public accommodation” but that there was no
nexus between the goods and services complained of and the insurance
office.116 To illustrate, the Sixth Circuit in Parker explained:
While we agree that an insurance office is a public accommodation as expressly set forth in § 12181(7), plaintiff did
not seek the goods and services of an insurance office. Rather, Parker accessed a benefit plan provided by her private
employer and issued by MetLife. A benefit plan offered by
an employer is not a good offered by a place of public accommodation.117

109. Magee, 833 F.3d at 534 n.23.
110. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31–33.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 32 n.3.
113. Earll, 599 F. App’x at 695 (quoting Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)).
114. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114–15.
115. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3rd Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997).
116. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612–14; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
117. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
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Because the plaintiff in Parker did not seek the goods or services of
the insurance office does not mean that an insurance office is no longer
a “place of public accommodation.”118 Instead, the court in Parker
merely stated that the plaintiff must seek the goods and services of the
“place of public accommodation” for Title III to apply.119 Oddly
enough, the Ninth Circuit in Weyer cited this exact paragraph as support.120
The Ninth Circuit’s mistake is just another example of how
courts on both sides of the circuit split fail to understand the difference
between a “place of public accommodation” and its services. This failure has implications for any entity’s services, such as websites, cellphones, and emails, because those services are typically of the entity
and not of a “place of public accommodation.”121
V. COURTS’ APPLICATION OF TITLE III TO WEBSITES
Although websites have existed for more than 30 years, the
Eleventh Circuit in 2018 was the first circuit to consider whether Title
III applies to a website.122 The Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit
court to address the issue.123 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, applying the Majority Approach, have held that a website itself is not a
“place of public accommodation.”124 That said, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits disagree about whether websites are free from Title III
liability if there is a nexus between a website and a “place of public
accommodation.”125 In 2018, the Eleventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, applied the Nexus Test to websites.126 Yet in 2021, the Eleventh
Circuit in Gil decided to go in a different direction by declining to
adopt the Nexus Test and holding that websites are never subject to
Title III liability because a website is not a “place of public

118. Id. at 1011.
119. Id.
120. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir.
2000).
121. See infra Part VI.
122. Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts LLC, 741 Fed. App’x 752, 753–54 (11th Cir.
2018).
123. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2019).
124. Robles, 913 F.3d at 905–06; Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266,
1274–77 (11th Cir. 2021).
125. Compare Robles, 913 F.3d at 905–06, with Gil, 993 F.3d at 1278–81.
126. Haynes, 741 Fed. App’x at 753–54.
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accommodation.”127 Unlike the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, district
courts within the First and Seventh Circuits have applied the Minority
Approach, holding that a website itself is a “place of public accommodation.”128
A. The Eleventh Circuit
As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit in 2018 was the first to
analyze whether Title III applies to a website.129 The court in Haynes
held that because Dunkin’ Donuts’ website includes a store locator and
allows customers to purchase gift cards, “the website is a service that
facilitates the use of Dunkin’ Donuts’ shops, which are places of public accommodation.”130 The court relied on its precedent in Rendon,
where the court held that the inaccessibility of a telephone selection
process prevented the plaintiffs from accessing a privilege of the defendant’s “place of public accommodation,” a television studio.131 The
court reasoned that:
[a]s much as the telephone selection process in Rendon prevented the plaintiffs in that case from accessing a privilege
of that defendant’s physical place of public accommodation,
the alleged inaccessibility of Dunkin’ Donuts’ website denies Haynes access to the services of the shops that are available on Dunkin’ Donuts’ website, which includes the information about store locations and the ability to buy gift cards
online.132
In essence, the court held that the store locator and gift cards are “services” of the physical stores, not that the website per se is a “service”
of the physical stores.133 That said, since the court designated the opinion to be unpublished, it has no precedential value.134

127. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1274–81.
128. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass.
2012); Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL
5186354, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017); Wright v. Thread Experiment, LLC, No. 19
-cv-01423-TAB, 2021 WL 243604, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021); Laufer v. Lily
Pond LLC C Series, No. 20-cv-617, 2020 WL 7768011, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30,
2020).
129. Haynes, 741 Fed. App’x at 753–54.
130. Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1; see also 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.

2022]

IS A WEBSITE SUBJECT TO TITLE III OF THE ADA

199

Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the Nexus Test in
Haynes, the Eleventh Circuit in Gil rejected to follow the Nexus
Test.135 First, the court held that a website is not a “place of public
accommodation” based on the twelve “public accommodation” categories.136 The court then addressed whether the website otherwise violates Title III, specifically whether the inaccessibility of WinnDixie’s website is “an ‘intangible barrier’ to accessing the goods, services, privileges, or advantages of Winn-Dixie’s physical stores.”137
The court held that Winn-Dixie’s website is not an intangible barrier
because it has limited functionality and is not the sole access point to
accessing the goods and services of its physical stores.138 Finally, the
court addressed Gil’s argument that there is a nexus between WinnDixie’s website and its physical stores.139 The court did not state
whether such a nexus existed and ultimately declined to adopt the
Nexus Test because the court found “no basis for it in statute or in
[their] precedent.”140 Still, the court went to considerable length to distinguish the facts from those in Robles, where the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Nexus Test. Ironically, the court in Gil did not mention or
distinguish its holding from the court’s holding in Haynes, which expressly adopted the Nexus Test.141
B. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in Robles held that there was a sufficient
nexus between Domino’s website and its physical restaurants because
Domino’s website included a store locator and allowed customers to
order pizzas for delivery or in-store pickup.142 The court reasoned that
“the alleged inaccessibility of Domino’s website and app impedes access to the goods and services of its physical pizza franchises—which
are places of public accommodation.”143 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit
in Haynes, the court did not state that the store locator or order
135. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1281 (11th Cir. 2021).
136. Id. at 1277.
137. Id. at 1278.
138. Id. at 1279.
139. Id. at 1281.
140. Id.
141. See Gil, 993 F.3d at 1266; see also Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts LLC, 741 F.
App’x 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2018).
142. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2019).
143. Id. at 905.
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functions were “services” of Domino’s physical stores.144 But the
court did state that the store locator and ordering functions established
a “nexus between Domino’s website and app and physical restaurants . . . .”145 Thus, assuming that the court understood the textual basis of the Nexus Test, the court considered these portions of Domino’s
websites to be “services” of Domino’s physical stores, even though
the court did not explicitly say so.
C. District Courts Within the Minority Approach
While no circuit court has held that a website is a “place of
public accommodation,” district courts applying the Minority Approach have held that a website itself is a “place of public accommodation.”146 These courts have relied mainly on circuit court precedent
that a “place of public accommodation” is not limited to a physical
place based on the twelve “public accommodation” categories, the services of an entity, and the ADA’s purpose.147 In terms of websites specifically, these courts have also relied on DOJ guidance on websites
and the ADA’s legislative history.148
Recently, two district courts within the First Circuit held that
Netflix’s video streaming website and Blue Apron’s cooking website
are “places of public accommodation.”149 In the first case, the district
court in National Ass’n of the Deaf held that Netflix’s video streaming
website is a “place of public accommodation.”150 The court reasoned
that the First Circuit’s binding precedent in Carparts “applies with
equal force to services purchased over the internet, such as video programming offered through the Watch Instantly web site” because “[i]n
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass.
2012); Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL
5186354, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017); Wright v. Thread Experiment, LLC, No. 19
-cv-01423-TAB, 2021 WL 243604, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021); Laufer v. Lily
Pond LLC C Series, No. 20-cv-617, 2020 WL 7768011, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30,
2020).
147. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., Inc.,
37 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 1994); Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459
(7th Cir. 2001).
148. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *4.
149. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200–02; Access Now, Inc., 2017
WL 5186354, at *3.
150. 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200–02.
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a society in which business is increasingly conducted online, excluding businesses that sell services through the internet from the ADA
would ‘run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely frustrate Congress’s intent . . . . ’”151 While the court determined that Netflix’s video streaming services fell under several “public accommodation” categories, the court did not address how Netflix’s video
streaming services were a place.152 Even so, the court held that Netflix’s video streaming service was a “place of public accommodation”
because “the legislative history of the ADA makes clear that Congress
intended the ADA to adapt to changes in technology.”153
In the second case, Access Now, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant, Blue Apron, for allegedly failing to make its cooking website
compatible with screen reading technology.154 While the court held
that Blue Apron’s website was a “place of public accommodation,”
the court’s reasoning differed slightly from the district court’s holding
in National Ass’n of the Deaf.155 Rather than relying heavily on legislative history to support its holding, the court reasoned that while
“Courts of Appeals differ on what constitutes a ‘public accommodation’ in the website context, the First Circuit Court of Appeals appears
to consider websites, standing alone, as public accommodations under
circumstances such as these. That authority binds this court.”156 It is
unclear to which case the court was referring to because it cited no
circuit court case to support the proposition.157 The only First Circuit
case that the district court cited was Carparts, which did not involve a
website or discuss Title III’s applicability to websites.158 Still, the
court held that Blue Apron’s website was a “place of public accommodation” based on the First Circuit’s reasoning in Carparts.159
The district courts’ holdings in National Ass’n of the Deaf and
Access Now, Inc. also follow holdings of district courts within the Seventh Circuit.160 For example, a district court within the Seventh Circuit
151. Id. at 200 (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 20).
152. Id. at 201.
153. Id. at 200–01.
154. Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL 5186354, at *3–4.
155. Id. at *3.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Wright v. Thread Experiment, LLC, No. 19-cv-01423-TAB, 2021 WL
243604, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021); Laufer v. Lily Pond LLC C Series, No. 20-

202

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

recently held that a defendant’s website was a “place of public accommodation” based on DOJ guidance, other district courts’ holdings, and
Seventh Circuit precedent.161 As for DOJ guidance, the court cited the
DOJ’s 2018 letter mentioned in Part II(C) and interpreted the letter to
mean that the DOJ considers websites a “place of public accommodation.”162 In terms of the holdings of other district courts, the court mentioned that “there is nonetheless significant momentum from district
courts across the nation supporting an interpretation of the ADA which
mandates such compliance, regardless of whether the website is associated with any physical store.”163 Like the district courts within the
First Circuit and their reliance on circuit court precedent that did not
involve websites, the court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s holding in
Morgan that also did not involve a website.164 In sum, district courts
within both the First and Seventh Circuits rely mainly on circuit court
precedent, legislative history, and DOJ guidance to support their holdings.165
VI. WEBSITES “OF” A PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION SHOULD
BE SUBJECT TO TITLE III
A. Websites Are Not a Place of Public Accommodation
A website is not a “place of public accommodation” because,
even if it falls within one of the twelve “public accommodation” categories, it is not a “place.” Still district courts within the First and Seventh Circuits have consistently held that a website is a “place of public
accommodation.”166 These courts do not even attempt to interpret the
word “place.” Instead, like the First and Seventh Circuits, they skate
over the existence of the word “place.” Along with following the precedents of the First and Seventh Circuits that interpret a “place of public
accommodation” to mean a “service of a public accommodation,”
cv-617-WMC, 2020 WL 7768011, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30, 2020).
161. Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *3.
165. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass.
2012); Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL
5186354, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017); Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *2; Laufer,
2020 WL 7768011, at *2–3.
166. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *4.
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these courts rely on the ADA’s legislative history and DOJ guidance.167 But these secondary sources also lend no support to these
courts’ holdings that a website is a “place of public accommodation.”
1. Faulty Circuit Court Precedent
The most common source of support on which district courts
within the Minority Approach rely on are the First and Seventh Circuits’ holdings in Carparts and Morgan.168 As explained above, the
First and Seventh Circuits interpret a “place of public accommodation” to mean a “service of public accommodation.”169 As for the word
“place,” district courts within the Minority Approach have followed
the same circuit court precedent that ignores the word “place.”170 For
example, the court in National Ass’n of the Deaf stated that “[t]he
ADA lists twelve categories of entities that qualify as places of public
accommodation.”171 Congress provided twelve categories of entities
that qualify as “public accommodations,” not “places of public accommodation.”172 The applicable regulations define a “place” as a “facility,” which in turn is defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances,
roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.”173 Thus, even if Netflix’s video streaming website or any other website falls within one of the twelve categories, “the
language in question refers to ‘facility’ which appears clearly to be
defined as a physical structure.”174 Yet, the court in National Ass’n of
the Deaf, like every other district court applying the Minority

167. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *4.
168. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *2–
3.
169. See supra Part IV.
170. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *2–
3.
171. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
173. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2020).
174. Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496, 498
(N.D. Ill. 1997).
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Approach, conveniently glossed over the word “place” when interpreting a “place of public accommodation.”175
In addition, these district courts, like the First and Seventh Circuits, fail to distinguish “places of public accommodation” from “services of a place of public accommodation.”176 For example, in National Ass’n of the Deaf, the court reasoned that Carparts “applies with
equal force to services purchased over the internet, such as video programming offered through the Watch Instantly web site.”177 The court
added that “[in] a society in which business is increasingly conducted
online, excluding businesses that sell services through the Internet
from the ADA . . . severely frustrates Congress’s intent . . . .”178 However, Title III regulates services of a “place of public accommodation,”
not services of any business or “services which the lessor of the public
accommodation offers which fall within the scope of Title III.”179 In
National Ass’n of the Deaf, the video streaming website is a service of
Netflix, not a service of a place of public accommodation owned,
leased, or operated by Netflix. Thus, even if a website is a “service,”
the text regulates only websites of a “place of public accommodation,”
not every entity with a website.
2. Legislative History
The second most common source relied on by district courts
within the Minority Approach is unsurprisingly the ADA’s legislative
history.180 Not only is reliance on legislative history misplaced when
determining whether a website is a “place of public accommodation,”181 but the legislative history on which these district courts rely

175. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *2–
3.
176. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 18–20; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 459.
177. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
178. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr.,
Inc., 37 F.3d at 20).
179. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
180. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *2–
3.
181. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755
(2014) (“Our analysis begins and ends with the text of [the disputed statute] . . . .
This text is patently clear.”).
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does not support the position that a website is a “place of public accommodation.”
As with any issue of statutory interpretation, a court must
begin with the words of the statute.182 Indeed, the First Circuit in Carparts ironically stated: “We begin our analysis by looking at the language of the statute.”183 Thus, whether a website is a “place of public
accommodation” should be determined by the text of the law, not the
supposed “purpose” of the law.184 Here, the answer is clear. A website
is not a “place.” Thus, the use of legislative history is unjustified.185
But district courts within the Minority Approach refer to the text as
“irrelevant” because the supposed “intent” of Congress supports the
holding that a website is a “place of public accommodation.”186 But,
“[w]e are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what
Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.”187 Furthermore,
these courts derive the supposed “intent” of Congress from a single
House Committee Report. Of pertinence is this quote from Former Associate Justice Antonin Scalia:
My Court is frequently told, in briefs and in oral argument,
that ‘Congress said thus-and-so’ when in fact what is being
quoted is not the law promulgated by Congress, nor even any
text endorsed by a single house of Congress, but rather the
statement of a single committee of a single house, set forth
in a committee report.188

182. See, e.g., Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721
(2017) (“[W]e begin, as we must, with a careful examination of the statutory text.”);
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory interpretation, as we always
say, begins with the text . . . .”).
183. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
184. Id.
185. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The text is clear, so
we need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”).
186. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass.
2012); Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL
5186354, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017); Wright v. Thread Experiment, LLC, No. 19
-cv-01423-TAB, 2021 WL 243604, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021); Laufer v. Lily
Pond LLC Series, 2020 WL 7768011, at *2–3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30, 2020).
187. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
188. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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Even if we return to the Church of the Holy Trinity days, when
legislative intent trumps the text of the law,189 it is still improbable that
congressional intent supports the application of Title III to websites
because websites did not exist when the ADA was enacted. Yet these
district courts rely on a single House Committee Report that states that
“the Committee intends that the types of accommodation and services
provided to individuals with disabilities, under all of the titles of this
bill, should keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the
times.”190 These district courts have interpreted this to mean that Congress intended the “public accommodation” categories to expand in
light of technology.191 Contrary to these courts’ conclusions, the report
does not suggest that the “public accommodation” categories should
expand in light of technology, only that the types of accommodation
and services should adapt with technology. Thus, even the legislative
history these district courts rely on does not actually support the position that a website is a “place of public accommodation.”
3. DOJ Guidance
Another common source district courts within the Minority
Approach rely on is an opinion letter from the DOJ.192 As mentioned,
the DOJ sent a letter to members of Congress addressing the “unresolved questions about the applicability of the ADA to websites.”193
In this letter, Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd wrote:
The Department first articulated its interpretation that [the]
ADA applies to public accommodations’ websites over 20
years ago. This interpretation is consistent with the ADA’s
title III requirement that goods, services, privileges, or activities provided by places of public accommodation be equally
accessible to people with disabilities.194
189. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
190. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II) at 109 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 391.
191. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *2; Laufer, 2020 WL 7768011, at *3.
192. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *5; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *2.
193. Letter from Members of Cong. to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Dep’t
of Just. (June 20, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/121
/2018/06/ADA-Final-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ER3-WXML].
194. Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to Ted Budd, U.S. H.R. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/121/2018/10/DOJ-letter-to-congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8KA-
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District courts within the Minority Approach have interpreted this
statement to mean that the DOJ considers websites a “place of public
accommodation.”195 The DOJ’s position, however, is not that a website is a “place of public accommodation,” but that if a “place of public
accommodation” has a website, then the website is subject to liability
under Title III. Even if the DOJ had stated in this letter that a website
is a “place of public accommodation,” the letter is merely a general
policy statement, which is not legally binding; it is merely persuasive
authority at best.196
B. Certain Websites are a “Service,” “Privilege,” or “Advantage”
of a Place of Public Accommodation197
1. Websites Are a “Service,” “Privilege,” or “Advantage” for
Purposes of Title III
If websites are not a “place of public accommodation,” the
question then becomes whether websites are subject to Title III based
on a different part of the text.198 As stated above, the text concerns the
“goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”199 For starters, websites
are in some cases a “good” of an entity but are not a “good” of a “place
of public accommodation.”200 Websites are also not a “facility,” which
is defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks,
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is

KNJM].
195. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199; Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL
5186354, at *3; Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *2.
196. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
197. This Comment does not address the “intangible barrier” concept mentioned
in Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021), because the
concept concerns whether a website discriminates or not, and this Comment is solely
limited to whether a website is subject to Title III.
198. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2021).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
200. Stoutenborough v. Nat’ l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1995).
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located.”201 But some websites are a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” of a “place of public accommodation.”
The ADA does not define these terms. In such cases, courts
look to the word’s plain meaning at the time of enactment.202 In the
context of website accessibility lawsuits, the dissent in Gil was the
first to do so and used the dictionary definitions present when the ADA
was passed:
The dictionary definition of “service” is “useful labor that
does not produce a tangible commodity.” Service, Webster’s
New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961). A “privilege” is
“a right . . . granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor.” Privilege, Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d
ed. 1961). And an “advantage” is “a more favorable or improved position or condition.” Advantage, Webster’s New
International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961).203
Under these definitions, the dissent concluded that WinnDixie’s website was a “service,” “privilege,” and “advantage” of its
physical stores because it allowed customers to refill prescriptions and
link coupons to their rewards cards.204 The majority opinion disagreed
and stated that under the dissent’s interpretation “virtually anything
. . . might be deemed a ‘service,’ ‘privilege,’ or ‘advantage’ for the
purpose of Title III.”205 The majority opinion did not dispute the dissent’s definitions of these terms, state its interpretation of these words,
or justify its departure from the letter of the law.206 Instead of “giv[ing]
effect, if possible, to every clause and word” of Title III,207 the court
ignored those terms and considered only whether a website is a “place
of public accommodation.”208
Even if the dissent’s interpretation is too broad, “virtually anything . . . might be deemed a ‘service,’ ‘privilege,’ or ‘advantage’”
under the narrowest interpretations of those terms. The majority opinion may not agree with Congress’s decision to include such broad
201. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2020).
202. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S.
397, 403 (2011).
203. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1294.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1281.
206. See id. at 1281–84.
207. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)).
208. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1266.
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terms, but as Justice Scalia has noted, “Congress can enact foolish
statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which
is which and rewrite the former.”209 In essence, the majority opinion
rewrote Title III to include only the words “place of public accommodation.” But Title III also includes the words “service,” “privilege,”
and “advantage.” And for purposes of Title III, websites are a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” under the plain meaning of those
terms.
2. Only Websites “Of” a Place of Public Accommodation Should be
Subject to Title III
While websites are a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” for
purposes of Title III, only websites “of” a “place of public accommodation” are subject to Title III. Courts applying the Nexus Test have
interpreted the word “of” to mean a connection or nexus.210 Other
courts, however, have failed to understand the textual basis for the
Nexus Test. For example, the majority and dissent in Gil agreed that
there was “no basis for it in the statute or in our precedent.”211 But as
mentioned, the word “of” is the statutory support for the Nexus Test.
A court may interpret the word “of” differently, but there is a clear
textual basis for the Nexus Test.
While the Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuits in Robles and
Haynes applied the Nexus Test to websites, several questions arise
from these courts’ holdings. The first question that arises is what kinds
of websites are “of” a “place of public accommodation.” The Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits held that websites that include things such as a
store locator or the option to purchase gift cards are “of” a “place of
public accommodation.”212 But courts are likely to vary depending on
the facts present and the various interpretations of the word “of.” The
second question that arises is whether the entire website is subject to
Title III or only the portions of the website that establish the connection. For example, if a website has a store locator or an option to
209. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 20 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
210. See Gil, 993 F.3d at 1266.
211. Id. at 1281.
212. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2019);
Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts LLC, 741 F. App’x 752, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2018).
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purchase gift cards, is any other feature of the website subject to the
ADA. That said, if courts are going to faithfully apply the text of Title
III to websites, the differences between courts should not be based on
whether a website is a “place of public accommodation,” or whether a
website is a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” of a “place of public accommodation.” Rather, the differences should be based on
whether a website is “of” a “place of public accommodation.”
VII. CONCLUSION
The first requirement to deciding whether a website is subject
to Title III is determining whether the entity has a “place of public
accommodation.” The entity’s operations must fall within one of the
twelve “public accommodation” categories. In turn, those operations
must be those of a “place.” For example, Netflix video streaming services would fall within one of the twelve “public accommodation” categories but would not be a “place of public accommodation” because
it is not a “place.” In contrast, a movie theater would be a “place of
public accommodation” because its services fall within the twelve
“public accommodation” categories and is a “place.”
The second requirement is determining whether the website is
“of” the “place of public accommodation.” While websites are “services,” “privileges,” and “advantages” for purposes of Title III, the
website must be “of” the “place of public accommodation” to be subject to Title III. Websites that are merely “of” the entity are not subject
to Title III. For example, Netflix’s website is a service, privilege, and
advantage “of” the entity rather than “of” any “place of public accommodation.” Furthermore, the fact that an entity has both a website and
a “place of public accommodation” does not necessarily establish liability under Title III. The website must be “of” a “place of public accommodation.”

